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Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2
on Sales: Some Observations on
Four Fundamentals
By NonmAN D. LATnjN*
ON January 1, 1965, the California version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code became effective as to transactions and events whose
factual bases occurred subsequent to that date; however, the several
acts which have been displaced by this new code remain effective as
to transactions entered into prior to that time.- The student not yet
admitted to the profession must absorb the essence of the common law
and of legislation preceding this new code and its interpretation by
the courts, as well as a knowledge of the code and of the major interpre-
tations made of the code as adopted and already in operation in a
number of jurisdictions in the United States.2 He should be cognizant
of the important differences between the California Commercial Code
and the official Uniform Commercial Code, since he will eventually
deal with problems involving the law of other states whose enactment
of the official draft has been more generously aimed at making com-
mercial law uniform.3 The practicing lawyer must reexamine what
he has previously learned in the commercial law area and absorb
what is new or seems to be new under the code.
There is little doubt that the Uniform Commercial Code is the
most important single enactment into law of commercial doctrine that
Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
'CAL. COMM. CODE: § 10101.
2 The Uniform Commercial Code is in effect in the following states, the time of
taking effect being stated in parentheses: Alaska (Jan. 1, 1963); Arkansas (Jan. 1,
1962); California (Jan. -1, 1965); Connecticut (Oct. 1, 1961); District of Columbia
(Jan. 1, 1965); Georgia (Jan. 1, 1964); Illinois (July 2, 1962); Indiana (July 1, 1964);
Kentucky (July 1, 1960); Maine (Dec. 31, 1964); Maryland (Feb. 1, 1964); Massachu-
setts (Oct. 1, 1958); Michigan (Jan. 1, 1964); Montana (Jan. 2, 1965); New Hampshire
(July 1, 1961); New Jersey (Jan. 1, 1963); New Mexico (Jan. 1, 1962); New York
(Sept. 27, 1964); Ohio (July 1, 1962); Oklahoma (Jan. 1, 1963); Oregon (Sept. 1,
1963); Pennsylvania (July 1, 1954); Rhode Island (Jan. 2, 1962); Tennessee (July 1,
1964); West Virginia (July 1, 1964); Wyoming (Jan. 2, 1962).
The code will shortly become effective in the following states: Missouri (July 1,
1965); Nebraska (Sept. 2, 1965); Virginia (Jan. 1, 1966); Wisconsin (July 1, 1965).
S CAL. Comm. CODy § 1102, particularly subsection (2) (c) expressing one under-
lying purpose and policy of the code to be "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions."
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this country has experienced. This is not to say that preceding uniform
legislation was not important. At the time it was recommended and
adopted in many states it was vital and in accord with the business
tradition of the time and place. But business practices change and
unless such legislation is broadly enough framed to permit new and
desirable business practices by judicial interpretation the law is likely
to become barren because of its impotency to recognize this change.
The new code, while aimed at uniformity, permits the elasticity so
necessary in the law of so dynamic an area as that of commercial
practices.4 Where the code does not provide otherwise, its provisions
may be varied by agreement thus making it possible through the
drafting of contracts and documents to make the law the parties favor.
This, of course, has been possible without legislative aid from the
earliest times. However, under the code, even by agreement the
parties may not disclaim the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care.5
The purpose of this article is to discuss some fundamental matters
involving Article 2 on Sales. Those trained in the law of sales of
personalty at common law and under the Uniform Sales Act will
have to wrestle with these matters on a somewhat different basis
because of change of terminology, or theory of recovery, or substantive
law itself. Matters primarily concerned with basic contract law such
as offer and acceptance, the necessity of consideration, unconscionable
contracts, et cetera, will not be considered here except incidentally,6
although the code contains several very important changes in the
law concerning such matters. The areas to be considered here are:
(1) distinctions made between professionals and nonprofessionals
in sales transactions; (2) matters of title and risk of loss under the
code; (3) types of goods-"movables" under the code; and (4) the
Statute of Frauds.
Professionals and Nonprofessionals
When merchants deal with merchants, the ground rules are usually
known by them and, understandably, may differ from those applicable
to nonmerchants and ultimate consumers whose knowledge of such
4 CAL. Comm. CODE § 1102(2) states that, "Underlying purposes and policies of
this code are (a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties. . .
5 CAL. Comm. CODE §§ 1102(3)-02(4).
6 See generally HAwxLA.N, S,41.xs ANm Bvrx SAnVs 1-24 (1963).
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rules is limited. The code in a number of its sections so distinguishes
and thus departs in material respect from the Uniform Sales Act
approach. The term "merchant" is defined as: "a person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attrib-
uted by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill."7 And "between merchants" means: "any transaction with
respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or
skill of merchants."8 The inexperienced seller or buyer who is not a
merchant may thus come within the special rules by employing an
agent whose occupation carries a connotation of such knowledge or
skill, whereas had he dealt personally the special rules would not
have applied. This may offer some unanticipated dangers to the non-
professional buyer or seller who deals through one who comes within
the description of this provision. Furthermore, "the professional status
under the definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to
the goods, specialized knowledge as to business practices, or special-
ized knowledge as to both .... ." Thus a nonmerchant because of his
specialized knowledge may find himself in the professional class.
The "between merchants" description has importance in its appli-
cation to the Statute of Frauds. For instance, a prompt writing in con-
firmation of an oral contract for the sale and purchase of goods for
the price of 500 dollars or more which is sufficient against the sender-
merchant will bind the receiver if he has reason to know its contents
and if it is sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made,
unless his written notice of objection to its contents is given within
ten days of its,,receipt. Thus, the receiving merchant may be bound
although he has never signed a contract or memorandum.' 0
7 CAL. Comm . CODE § 2104(1).
8 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2104(3). Compare UNwon SALs ACT §§ 15(2)-15(3),
16(c).
9 UNnos,m CoImacALk CODE § 2-104, comment 2 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
1 0 CAL. CoMM. CODE § 2201(2). Although, note the ease by which a signature
may be found under the code. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by
a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(39). The
official comment enlarges upon this: "Authentication may be printed, stamped or writ-
ten; it may be by initials or by thumbprint. It may be on any part of the document and
in appropriate cases may be found in a billhead or letterhead. No catalog of possible
authentications can be complete and the court must use common sense and commercial
experience in passing upon these matters. The question always is whether the symbol
was executed or adopted by the party with present intention to authenticate the writing."
May, 1965] U.C.C ARTICLE 2
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Furthermore, a firm written offer by a merchant to buy or sell
goods giving assurance that such offer will remain open is binding
and irrevocable on the offeror-merchant, though not supported by
consideration, for the time stated, or if no time is stated then for a
reasonable time, but in no event can the time exceed three months."-
And where an acceptance of an offer or a written confirmation contains
additional or different terms from those offered or agreed upon, this
ordinarily operates as an acceptance (unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms),
the additional terms being construed merely as proposals for addition
to the contract. But as between merchants the additional terms be-
come part of the contract unless the offer expressly limits acceptance
to its terms, or unless the additional terms materially alter the con-
tract, or a prompt notification of objection to the terms is given or one
has previously been given.'2
There will be disagreement as to what additional or different
terms "materially alter" such an offer though the comment to the
official code gives some examples of what normally will or will not be
considered material.'3 Commercial usage will play an important part
in solving this problem as it does in other parts of the code. The
offeror may always protect himself by confining the offeree's accept-
1 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2205.
12 CAL. Comi. CODE § 2207.
Is "4. Examples of typical clauses which would normally 'materially alter' the con-
tract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by
the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchant-
ability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty
normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100% deliveries in a case
such as a contract by cannery, where the usage of the trade allows greater quantity
leeways; a clause reserving to the seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure
to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring that complaints be made in a time
materially shorter than customary or reasonable.
"5. Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and
which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is
seasonably given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the
seller's exemption due to supervening causes beyond his control, similar to those covered
by the provision of this Article on merchant's excuse by failure of presupposed condi-
tions or a clause fixing in advance any reasonable formula of proration under such
circumstances; a clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or
in the case of a purchase for sub-sale, providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a
clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's standard credit
terms where they are within the range of trade practice and do not limit any credit
bargained for; a clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the
customary trade tolerances for acceptance 'with adjustment' or otherwise limiting
remedy in a reasonable manner (see Sections 2-718 and 2-719)." U.C.C. § 2-207, com-
ments 4-5.
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ance to the terms of the offer. And, quite naturally, if two merchants
have used their own confirming forms and there are conflicting pro-
visions, each has notice of the other's conflicting terms without further
notice. The contract will then consist of the terms originally expressly
agreed to, plus those on which their confirmations agree, plus the
terms which do not materially alter the offer, if such there be.'4 The
rule requiring an exact matching of the acceptance with the terms of
the offer, a rule which has frequently been an unanticipated trap in
contract law, now, through the adoption of a merchant's concept of
a more practical approach, must bow to this new concept.
Under the provisions of the official code an oral modification or
rescission of a written and signed sales contract is valid without con-
sideration except where it comes within the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds or when the signed agreement excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing. But: "except as between mer-
chants such a requirement [which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing] on a form supplied by the merchant must
be separately signed by the other party."" The California version of
this section omits all reference to merchants and to the Statute of
Frauds, thus putting merchants and nonmerchants on the same footing.
It provides that modification of a written contract may only be made
by a written agreement or by an oral agreement which 'has been
fully executed by both parties.'( The purpose of the official code pro-
vision as stated in a comment to it is "to protect and make effective
all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without
regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjust-
ments."' 7 The California version simplifies the paper work in such
cases by establishing its own Statute of Frauds in this area thus making
it necessary to have a written modification or an oral agreement fully
executed by both parties where modification is made in written con-
tracts whether they come within or without the 500 dollar area. There
is saving grace, however, in the provision in subsection 4 of the same
section, which allows, but does not require, the attemhpt at modification
or rescission to operate as a waiver when it does not satisfy the written
requirement.'8 Thus an oral waiver which has been relied upon and
resulted in a change of position to the detriment of the waivee clears
'4 U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 6.
'5U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
16 CA. Comm . CoDE § 2209(2).
17 U.C.C. § 2-209, comment 1.
18 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2209(4).
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the hurdle of even the Statute of Frauds. In this approach the Cali-
fornia version has followed its Civil Code provision that, "a contract
in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed
oral agreement, and not otherwise."19 There is something to be said
for the California approach in this matter since the official code pro-
vision requires an additional signature by one who is not a merchant
when the merchant has included in his form a provision that the
contract may only be modified by a writing. Thus far, of thirty
adoptions of the code, California is the only state which has seen fit
to revamp this section.
The "merchant" classification also becomes important in the area
of warranty. An implied warranty of merchantability in a contract for
the sale of goods exists if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind unless such warranty is excluded or modified by
the agreement.2 0 Even though the seller is not a merchant as here
defined, if he guarantees generally the goods, section 2314 may be
used as a guide concerning the "content of the resulting express war-
ranty."2 ' Thus, even though the seller is not a merchant, if the sug-
gestion of the official comment is accepted by the court, he may be
held to have expressly warranted those things which this section
impliedly warrants where a merchant is involved. This may have
"particular significance in the case of second-hand sales, and ...
further significance in limiting the effect of fine-print disclaimer
clauses where their effect would be inconsistent with large-print asser-
tions of guarantee.' "22
In sales on approval where the buyer has duly notified his seller
of his election to return the goods, a merchant-buyer is required to
follow any reasonable instructions given him by his seller.23 Such
instructions might, perhaps, include an order to sell in the local market
or to forward the goods to a person designated by the seller. The risk
of loss would remain on the seller during this additional period caused
by the seller's demands, and the expense of the merchant-buyer would
19 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1698.
2 0 CAL. CoMyM. CODE § 2314(1). UNwoRm SArs AcT § 15 provides: "Where the
goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of merchantable quality." The code provision spells out the several
characteristics of merchantability thus making for certainty in an area where there was
much difference of opinion. CAL. Commsi. CODE § 2314(2).
21 U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 4.
22 1bid.
23 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2327(1)c.
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be the seller's liability as would reasonable compensation for carrying
out the seller's instructions, such as a fee for selling the goods.24
In general, the code has left it to other rules of law within the
state where the goods are situated to determine the effect upon the
seller's creditors of the retention of possession by a seller after the
sale. However, where a merchant-seller has retained possession for
not more than a "commercially reasonable time," in good faith and in
the current course of trade, retention of the goods after a sale or
identification to a contract of sale is not fraudulent.25 Here, again, a
distinction has been made between professionals and nonprofessionals.
One of the most controversial provisions of the official code is
that which gives a merchant who deals in goods of the kind entrusted
to him the power to transfer all the rights of the entruster to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business. Further, it is immaterial whether
he procured the entrusting by methods which would constitute larceny
in a criminal sense or whether, after he acquired their possession
legally, he disposed of them in such a way as to lay him open to a
criminal prosecution.26 That is, he may have embezzled them. Thus,
were a watch left for repair with a jeweler who also deals in goods
of that kind, a sale to a buyer in ordinary course would give good
title to him. The entruster would have his remedy against the jeweler
for conversion which would probably be of little value in a case of
this kind. The California version has at least attempted to limit the
application of the power to transfer to one who has been entrusted
"for the purpose of sale, obtaining offers to purchase, locating a buyer,
or the like .... 27 But there may be some question as to whether
this is a limitaiton on the power of the entrustee or simply a partial
description of what is included in the word "entrusting."28 If it is
considered a limitation of power, there is still the possibility that the
entruster will be estopped if the factual conditions warrant it, or that
a court will find an implied authority to sell, obtain an offer, et cetera,
24 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2711(3). Compare Cal. Stat. 1931, cl. 1070, § 1, at 2255
(repealed) (UNwFonm SATLs AcT § 69(1)(d)).
25 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2402(2).
26 U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2)-03( 3). "Buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in
U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
2 7 CAL. CoNal. CODE § 2403(3).
28
"Entrusting" is defined in CAL. Comi. CODE § 2403(3) as: "'Entrusting' in-
cludes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession for the purpose of
sale, obtaining offers to purchase, locating a buyer, or the like, regardless of any condi-
tion expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of
whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods
have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law."
May, 1965] , U.C.C.-ARTICLE 2
in accord with the California provision. The official code has adopted
the English open market approach which favors the bona fide purchaser
from a reputable dealer rather than the owner who has entrusted goods
to the dealer. The subsection, however, apparently envisions within
the term 'larcenous" only the types of larceny where possession has
been obtained by fraudulent means. Under the code, one who has
obtained "title" by fraud may be held to have a voidable or defeasible
title which in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value becomes
absolute. The code codifies, as did the Uniform Sales Act, this rule
by providing: "A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value."29 And such a voidable
title holder need not be a merchant. But in a sale by a merchant
entrusted with possession of goods, protection is given to a "buyer in
ordinary course," whereas in a sale by one having a voidable title pro-
tection is given to a bona fide purchaser for value. This becomes im-
portant since the code spells out the value term in a different manner
from the consideration requirement of a "buyer in ordinary course."30
There are also other important differences which must be reckoned
with. One can more easily be a purchaser for value than a buyer in
ordinary course as the terms are used in the code.3 And of course there
will be many cases where one not a merchant, or a merchant who
does not deal in goods of the kind is involved. If the "nonmerchant"
has, by fraudulent representation amounting to obtaining personalty
by false pretenses, obtained a voidable title, that title becomes ab-
solute in a bona fide purchaser for value.32 This section goes on to
delineate the "power" (to transfer title) of one who has been delivered
goods "under a transaction of purchase" as including cases where the
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or where
delivery was made for a check later dishonored, or where the agree-
ment constituted a "cash sale," as well as where delivery was obtained
by fraudulent means punishable under the criminal law as larcenous.33
29 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2403(1); UNwoRM SALns Acr § 24.
So Compare CAL. Comm. CODE § 1201(9) concerning buyer in ordinary course,
with CAL. Comm. CODE §§ 1201(32)-01(33) concerning purchaser, and CAL. Comm.
CoDE § 1201(44) concerning value.
31 Ibid.
32 And this is made clearer (if possible) by CAL. Comm. CODE § 2403(1): "When
goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such
power [to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value] even though
"(d) The delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law."
33 CAL. CoM. CODE § 2403 (1) ab,cd.
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There may be some controversy over what constitutes a "transaction
of purchase," but the apparent reason behind this important section
is more fully to protect the good faith purchaser and, in order to do
that, the phrase should be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly.
Another distinction based upon the difference between profes-
sionals and nonprofessionals is contained in section 2603. A merchant-
buyer who rightfully rejects goods at a point where the seller has no
agent or place of business is under a duty after rejection "of goods in
his possession or contror" to follow reasonable instructions given by
the seller and if no instructions have been given and the goods are
perishable or "threaten to decline in value speedily," then to make
reasonable efforts to sell them for the seller's account. However, this
section goes on to provide that if on demand by the buyer indemnity
for expenses is not forthcoming from the seller, then any other instruc-
tions by the seller will be held unreasonable as a matter of law. 4
This perhaps suggests an initial procedure which could result in
practical benefit to the rejecting buyer. Subsection 2 of this section
gives the rejecting buyer reimbursement from the proceeds of the
sale for reasonable expenses of caring for and selling the rejected
goods plus a commission for selling them. The buyer, in carrying out
the provisions of this section, is held only to good faith conduct, and
his sale in good faith constitutes neither acceptance nor conversion
nor a basis for an action for damages.3 5 If the seller does not give any
instructions within a reasonable time after notice of rejection, and if
the goods are not of the perishable or speedily-declining-in-value type,
the buyer may store the goods for the seller's account, or reship them
to the seller, or resell for the seller's account with reimbursement for
expenses and with a commission for their sale.( These provisions have
adopted the good faith and commercial practices which have grown
up in the better commercial circles. One who is not a merchant-buyer,
but who has rightfully rejected goods of which he has physical
possession, has only the duty of holding the goods with reasonable
34 CAL. Co.m . CoDE § 2603(1). The section is framed in terms of "the market
of rejection!' at which the seller has no agent or place of business.
35 CAL. Comm. CoDE § 2603(3). U.C.C. § 2-603(3), comment 1, states: "This
section recognizes the duty imposed upon the merchant buyer by good faith and com-
mercial practice to follow any reasonable instructions of the seller as to reshipping, stor-
ing. delivery to a third party, reselling or the like. Subsection (1) goes further and
extends the duty to include the making of reasonable efforts to effect a salvage sale
where the value of the goods is threatened and the seller's instructions do not arrive
in time to prevent serious loss."
30 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2604.
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care for a time sufficient for the seller to remove them.37 And this is
so, whether the goods are perishable or not.
A further distinction between merchants and others also concerns
the matter of rejection which, as between merchants, requires the
rejecting merchant-buyer upon request by the merchant-seller in
writing to provide a full and final written statement of all defects
upon which the buyer proposes to rely. The buyer's failure to state
a defect ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes his reliance
on such a defect either to justify rejection or establish breach.3,8 The
failure to reply to the seller's request, or to fail to state defects which
a reasonable search ought to 'have turned up, could be most damaging
to the rejecting buyer. The practical advice to give one's client seems
evident.
A distinction is also made in contracts of sale between merchants
and between others when one of the merchants has reasonable grounds
for believing the other may not be able to perform as required by the
contract and demands assurance from the other of due performance.
As between mechants "the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
and the adequacy of any assurance offered" is to be determined
according to commercial standards 39 On the other 'hand, where one or
both parties are not merchants and reasonable grounds exist for
belief of insecurity, the insecure party, until he receives assurance
for performance, may suspend his performance for which he has not
yet received the agreed return if this would be "commercially reason-
able."40 As to merchants, the reasonableness of the grounds for in-
security and the assurance of due performance may well differ from
these incidents where merchants are not involved. As to both mer-
chants and others, the failure of the one upon whom a justified
demand has been made to provide within a reasonable time (not
more than thirty days) adequate assurance constitutes a repudiation
of the contract.41
As to risk of loss in the absence of breach, the code makes no dis-
tinctions between merchants and nonmerchants where the contract
requires or authorizes the seller to ship goods by carrier and where the
3 7 CAL. Co M. CODE § 2602(2)(b). Subsection (2)(c)-makes this doubly certain
by providing that "the buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully
rejected."
3S CAL. COMM. CODE § 2605()b.
3 9 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2609(2). The official comment is instructive on the matter
of commercial standards.
40CAL. Com.. CODE § 2609(1).
41 CAL. CoMM. CODE § 2609(4).
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goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved,
whether by negotiable document of title or otherwise. If not within
these areas, the risk of loss passes to the buyer upon his physical
receipt of the goods if his seller is a merchant. If his seller is not a
merchant, risk passes to -him on tender of delivery rather than upon
receipt of the goods. However, the provisions of this section are
subject to contrary agreement.42
The code approach in distinguishing between merchants and non-
merchants is functionally desirable since it agrees with the evolution
of the past half-century of customs and practices in the commercial
community. The changes from the older law should be troublesome
only to lawyers, while merchants will find that the new code is more
in phase with their customary practices.
Matters of Title and Risk of Loss Under the Code-
The Importance of Identification
At common law and under the Uniform Sales Act, lawyers have
become accustomed to deal with many problems by what has become
known as the "lump title" concept. Section 18 of the Uniform Sales
Act provides that the intent of the parties controls in ascertaining
where and when "title" passes to specific or ascertained goods. Since
the parties rarely indicate this in their contracts, a series of inferences
applicable to both specific and future goods is provided for in section
19 which provides, in the absence of such an intent indicated by
word or act of the parties or usages of trade, a solution based upon
their probable intent. For the most part the inferences were lifted
from the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893 which was a codification
of the then existing common law. However, there were errors in what
was thought to be the common law of England and these purportedly
were corrected in the American act.43 Nevertheless, under both acts
the basic analytical concept is "title." If it were a question of deter-
mining whether the purchase price could be collected, or whether
the risk of loss was on one or the other party, or whether some tax on
the chattel should be paid by one or the other party, or whether an
attaching creditor of one or the other could claim an interest in the
goods, or whether a bona fide purchaser from the buyer in possession
could succeed against the seller, et cetera, the title approach was the
one used. While title and risk of loss could be separated by agreement
42 CAL. CoMM. CODE § 2509.
4 3 Three rather serious errors incorporated into the English act are found in Sale
of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, §§ 18(2)-18(3), 62(1).
May, 1965]
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it was a rare case where the contract provided for this. And any dis-
cerning student of the cases soon discovered that, in many instances,
it was just as reasonable for the court to hold that title was in the
party not receiving the judgment. The uncertainty of such an approach,
especially in the highly complex commercial community of today,
was sufficient justification for a change to an approach diametrically
opposed to that of the lump title concept.
Title under the code is of small consequence except for the few
provisions which specifically mention it or under circumstances not
provided for in the code.44 The rights, obligations and remedies of
seller, buyer, purchasers and other third parties must be sought for
in other provisions of the code.45 If specific situations are not covered
by other provisions of the code and title matters become material, the
code has set up some title rules. Explicit agreement of the parties
may settle the time and place of title's passing. However, unless other-
wise explicitly agreed, title passes at the time and place "at which the
seller completes his performance with reference to the physical deliv-
ery of the goods."46 Apart from actual physical delivery to the buyer,
when the seller is authorized or is under contract to send the goods
to the buyer, but not to deliver them at destination, title passes to
the buyer on delivery to the carrier and if the contract requires the
seller to deliver at destination, title passes on "tender" there. There are
also special provisions concerning passage of title where delivery is
to be made without moving the goods, whether the transaction was
by document or not.47 But the clincher comes in the last subsection
of section 2401 which provides: "A rejection or other refusal by the
buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a
justified revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in the seller.
Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a 'sale."' 48 Thus,
despite title's having passed, if the buyer has not accomplished an
4 4 See CAL. Commna. CODE § 1103.
4 5 See, e.g., on risk of loss, CAL. Comm. CODE §§ 2509-10; on acceptance (CAL.
Comi. CODE § 2606) of the goods as a point from which the buyer cannot renege but
must pay the price, CAL. Comm. CODE § 2607(1); on specific performance, CAL. CoMM.
CODE § 2716; on recovery of the price where goods have been identified to the contract
and the seller after reasonable effort is unable to resell them at a reasonable price, CAL.
COmm. CODE § 2709(1) (b). Sale, however, is defined as consisting of "the passing of
title from the seller to the buyer for a price." CAL. Comm. CODE § 2106(1).
46 CAL'. Comm. CODE § 2401(2).
47CAL. COMM. CODE § 2401(3).
4 8 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2401(4). The provisions of this section are important in
ascertaining such matters as who is the "owner" for the purpose of taxation, for the
purpose of resale, etc.
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acceptance of the goods, or if he has accepted and has cause for a
justified rejection, he will not be liable for the price simply because
title has passed somewhere along the line. This is a quite different
approach from that of the Uniform Sales Act under which the passage
of title to the buyer gives the seller an action for the price of the
goods 4 9 and the buyer a right to the goods which may be enforced in
equity as well as law, even though remedies at law in many such
cases are adequate."0 In such situations the title concept under the
old legislation resulted in informal specific performance5' as well as
putting the risk of loss on the buyer even when the goods were under
the control and in the possession of the seller.512 Of course the courts
did not speak of the title concept as being a form of specific per-
formance though manifestly it was. Now, under the code, there is
more emphasis on a diversified scheme of analytical tools which allows
the jurist greater precision in fitting the law to the specific factual
situation.
Those trained in the law of sales under prior law will remember
that in contracts for the sale of goods not yet identified so as to be
classified as "specific goods" there had to be an "appropriation" by
one party with the consent of the other before title was assumed
to pass.53 Appropriation in the Uniform Sales Act sense becomes un-
important under the code. "Identification" (the term used in the code)
takes on a limited function under the code. It has little to do with
tide. It may be explicitly provided for as to time and place of occur-
rence by the agreement of the parties. In the absence of explicit
agreement, as to goods already existing and identified, it occurs at the
time the contract of sale is made. And as to goods not both existing
and identified (i.e., future goods), 54 it occurs "when the goods are
shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to
which the contract refers."55 It may even exist when the goods so
identified do not conform to those ordered so that the buyer has an
option to return or reject them.56 A special provision has reference to
future goods in the form of crops and the "unborn young" of animals
by enacting that identification occurs at the time the crops are planted
49 UNIORM SALs AcT § 63.
5o UNIo SALEs AcT § 66.
51 ibid.
52 UNIFORM SALES Aar § 22.
5 3 UNIFoRM SAiES AcT § 19(1)(4).
54 CAL. Com. CODE § 2105(2).
55 CAL. Comm. CoDE: § 2501(1)(a) and (b).
58 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2501(1).
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or otherwise become growing crops, and when the young are con-
ceived.57 The old doctrine of potential possession has been abandoned,
as it was in the Uniform Sales Act.
By identification of goods to the contract, the buyer obtains an
insurable interest and a "special property" in the goods, and as long
as the seller retains title to or any security interest in the goods he
retains an insurable interest. Furthermore, when identification is
solely by the seller he may "until [his] default or insolvency or notifica-
tion to the buyer that the identification is final substitute other goods
for those identified."58
While identification of goods to the contract has a limited function,
it may be important in a number of factual situations. For example,
if the seller has become insolvent within ten days after receipt
of the first installment of the price, the special property interest aris-
ing from the seller's identification of the goods to the contract gives
the buyer the right to the goods where he has paid part or all of the
price, provided he keeps good his tender of any unpaid portion of the
price.5 And, if the seller has identified conforming goods and the buyer
repudiates or is otherwise in breach before the risk of loss has passed
to him, if the goods are destroyed or injured without the seller's fault,
the seller may to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance
treat the risk of loss as being on the buyer during a commercially
reasonable time.60 Again, if the seller has identified goods to the con-
tract but later fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer may in a proper
case have specific performance, or a right to replevy the identified
goods provided his reasonable effort to effect cover has not resulted
in success or it is apparent that his efforts will not be effective.6
Identification of conforming goods in the seller's possession or
control which 'had not been identified at the time of the buyer's
breach is authorized after his breach, and this is so even though the
goods are unfinished provided they were "demonstrably intended"
for the particular contract. The seller may then treat such goods as a
subject for resale and thus establish his loss on resale as a basis for
57CAL. Comm. CODE § 2501(1)(c). Compare U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(c), which con-
tains a limitation to young to be born within 12 months after contracting or crops to be
harvested within 12 months "or the next normal harvest season after contracting which-
ever is longer." These limitations were not included in the California version.
58 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2501(2).
59 CAL. Commi. CODE § 2502. The seller has a somewhat comparable right under
CAL. Comm. CODE § 2702(2).
6 0 CAL. Com. CODE § 2510(3).
6ICAL. Comm. CODE §§ 2711(2)(b), 2716.
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recovery.62 And if the seller's reasonable efforts to resell do not ma
terialize in a sale at a reasonable price, he may recover the price
from the buyer.63
As to unfinished goods after the buyer's breach, the seller, aside
from being given the option to complete their manufacture and thus
wholly identify them to the contract, may choose to discontinue their
manufacture and resell them as scrap for the purpose of avoiding
loss and obtaining effective realization. However, the choice he makes
of completing manufacture or selling as scrap must be in the exercise
of reasonable commercial judgment. 4 Thus, while the seller's primary
remedy is through the power of resale, in the special case in which
resale is not practicable, the seller is allowed the price. Again, this
amounts to specific performance though not called that in the statute.65
However, the circumstances under which this kind of specific per-
formance is authorized are much more reasonable than through the
finding of title process under the Uniform Sales Act.
Where there has been an effective acceptance of conforming
goods by the buyer, the seller becomes entitled to the price.66 Accept-
ance is the point of no return: that is, on acceptance the buyer may
not reject the goods.67 His seller, of course, may waive and choose
some other remedy. The code also provides that the price may be
recovered for conforming goods which have been lost or damaged
within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has
passed to the buyer."6  For example, in the common F.O.B. seller's
point or C.I.F. transaction the buyer would be liable for the price
62CAL. Comm¢. CODE § 2704(1).
63CAL. Comm ,. CODE § 2709(1)(b).
64CAL. CoM . CODE § 2704(2).
65Compaie CAL. Comm. CODE § 2706(1): "Where the resale is made in good
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference
between the resale price and the contract price together with any incidental damages
allowed under the provisions of this division (Section 2710), but less expenses saved
in consequence of the buyer's breach," with UNwonm SALES AcT § 64(4).
66 CAL. CommV. CODE § 2709. As to what constitutes acceptance, see CAL. Comm.
CODE § 2606. "The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted," CAL.
Comm. CODE § 2607(1).
67 However, within a reasonable time the buyer may revoke his acceptance of a
lot or commercial unit if its nonconformity substantially impairs its value if the ac-
ceptance was made on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured, or if acceptance was reasonably induced
by the difficulty of discovery of the nonconformity or the assurances of the seller. CAL.
Commv. CODE § 2608.
6 8 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2709(1) (a). Passage of the risk of loss in the absence of
breach is covered by CAL. Comm. CODE § 2509 and where there has been breach by
CAL. CoMM. CODE § 2510.
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of conforming goods if those goods were lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after they had been duly delivered to
the carrier or received for shipment.69 The code also permits the seller
to recover the price of identified goods, although there has been no
acceptance by the buyer, if the buyer refuses to pay the price as it
comes due and the seller after a reasonable effort is unable to resell
them at a reasonable price or without such effort if the "circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing."0 And where
the buyer repudiates or breaches the contract subsequent to identifi-
cation, the risk of loss is on the buyer for a commercially reasonable
time (though the goods are in the seller's control) to the extent that
the seller's effective insurance does not cover the loss.71
Another point at which identification becomes important is when
goods are tortiously 'injured by a third person. If the goods have been
identified to the contract, the code gives a right of action to either
contracting party having title or a security interest, or having a special
property or an insurable interest in the goods. After recovery pro-
vision is made for an equitable distribution of whatever may be
recovered in case the plaintiff is not entitled to the entire judgment
recovered.72
Thus, though identification is the starting point of many remedies,
its function in title-finding is of small significance. The important
thing to stress is the necessity to examine specific sections on risk
of loss when damage or destruction of the goods occurs, to examine
recovery of price sections when such a remedy is sought, et cetera.
If there is no provision concerning the problem contained in the
69 F.O.B. seller's point contracts are dealt with in CAL. Comm. CoDE § 2509(1) (a),
and C.I.F. contracts in CAL. Commi.l. Co9PD §§ 2320-21, 2323. Where the contract requires
or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier and it "does require him to deliver
them at a particular destination and the goods are there duly tendered while in the
possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer." CAL. CoMm. CODE
§ 2509(1)(b).
"Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer
"(a) On his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or
"(b) On acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the
goods; or
"(c) After his receipt of a nonnegotiable document of title or other written direc-
tion to deliver, as provided in subdivision (4) (b) of Section 2503." CAL. Comm. CoDE
§ 2509(2).
•70 CAL. CoMM. CODE § 2709(1)(b).
7 1 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2510(3).
7 2 CAL. Comm.. CoDE § 2722.
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code-which will be a rare event-then whether title has passed may
become an important issue.78
Types of Goods--"Movables" Under the Code
All things which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract of sale, including things specially manufactured, come within
the definition of "goods." But money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities, and things in action are not within this term.
The unborn young of animals and growing crops and timber to be
cut, under the California version, fall within this term. Thus, a con-
tract of sale of the two last mentioned products, as well as other
things attached to the realty which are capable of being removed
without material injury to the realty, is a contract for the sale of goods
whether the severing is to be done by buyer or seller.74 And by identifi-
cation, the parties can effect a present sale before severance.75 The
code permits a recording of such sales or contracts of sale as docu-
ments transferring an interest in land so as to give notice to third
parties of -the buyer's rights under these contracts .7 The reference to
things attached to the realty which may be removed without material
harm to the realty is to chattels commonly termed "fixtures." The
code has generally avoided the use of this term because of the con-
fusion existing in prior case law as to what chattels come within
this descriptive term.77
A contract for the sale of minerals "or the like" or a structure or
its materials to be removed from realty is considered a contract for
the sale of goods provided they are to be severed by the seller but,
contrary to the case of the young of animals, or crops, or timber
(under the California version), there can be no present sale upon
identification but only after severance.78 A present sale of such
interests prior to severance can be made only through a formal
73 See CAL. Comm. CODE § 1103.
7 4 CAL. Co2, CoDE, §§ 2105(1), 2107(2). Compare the U.C.C. provision re
timber, § 2-107(1).
7 5 CAL. Comm. CoDE § 2107(2).
76 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2107(3).
7 7 See U.C.C. § 2-107, comment 2. But see U.C.C. § 9-401, first alternative sub-
section (1)(a), second alternative subsection (1)(b), third alternative subsection
(1) (b), where the term "fixtures" is used. The California version omits all reference to
"fixtures." CAL. CoMnMi. CODE § 9401.
7 8 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2107(1). "If the buyer is to sever, such transactions are
considered contracts affecting land and all problems of the Statute of Frauds and of
the recording of land rights apply to them." U.C.C. § 2-107(1), comment 1.
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real property transfer. Under the official code standing timber is
also within this area; therefore, prior to severance there cannot be
a present sale. This differs from the approach of the Uniform Sales
Act and the English viewpoint which provide that things attached to
the land which, under the contract of sale, are to be severed and
removed are subjects of present sale. 9 But the Uniform Sales Act has
no provision for filing such contracts as does the code. This omission
presented serious problems when conflicting interests were involved,
such as those of a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the land or
of things attached to the land, or of the seller's attaching creditors.
The filing provision of the new code now makes it possible to safe-
guard interests thus acquired through such informal contracts of sale.
"Future goods," under the code, are defined as those which are not
both existing and identified, and interests in them cannot pass until
such is the case. 0 Under the Uniform Sales Act future goods are those
"to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the
contract of sale."81 As has been stated heretofore, crops to be grown
and animals to be born are existing and can be identified as early
as their planting in case of crops and at their conception in case of
animals. It is at these points that interests in these chattels can be
conveyed. As to fungibles, the existence and identification of the
bulk or mass from which a portion by number, weight or other measure
is purchased determines whether an interest in common in them
passes.82 But "fungible" under the official code (though not under
the California version) is defined differently from the definition in the
Uniform Sales Act, thus:
"Fungible" with respect to goods or securities means goods or securi-
ties of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent
of any other like unit. Goods which are not fungible shall be deemed
fungible for the purposes of this Act to the extent that under a par-
ticular agreement or document unlike units are treated as equiva-
lents.83
7 9 Umnonm SALs AcT § 76(1) defines "goods" as including "all chattels personal
other than things in action and money. The term includes emblements, industrial
growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed
to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale." The new Code makes no
distinction between industrial and other crops. CAr. Comvnm. CODE § 2105(1).80 CAL. CoMm. CODE § 2105(2). The physical impossibility prior to existence and
identification is self-evident.
81 U-wow, S&Lrs Acn § 76(1). As under the Uniform Sales Act, a contract
purporting to make a present sale of future goods or any interest therein remains
a contract to sell and not a sale. CAL. CoMm. CODE § 2105(2).8 2 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2105(4). Compare Umronm SALEs Aar §§ 5-6.
88U.C.C. § 1-201(17).
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The California version omits the second sentence so that it is in accord
with the preceding Uniform Sales Act provision except that securities
are there included as fungibles.84 The comment to the official code
section states that this sentence was added "for clarity and accuracy." 5
It would seem that without this additional sentence the intent of the
parties would control as it did under the Uniform Sales Act,85 provided
the parties agree to an identification of the mass of which the subject
matter of purchase is a part.
Statute of Frauds
This new Statute of Frauds concerning sales of goods for a price
(not "value" as set out in the Uniform Sales Act) of 500 dollars or more
differs materially from that of the Uniform Sales Act which was
drafted on the order of the English legislation of 1677. 7 The philoso-
phy behind it is that "the writing afford a basis for believing that the
offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction.""" There must be
some writing which indicates that a contract of sale has been made
between the parties and it must be signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. But such a writing may omit or incorrectly state
a term agreed upon and still be sufficient, but not beyond the quantity
of goods shown on the writing. In fact, the only term required is the
84 Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(17), with CAL. Comme. CODE § 1201(7), and UNIFORM
SAs AcT § 76.
85 U.C.C. § 1-201, comment 17.
80 CAL. COMM. CODE § 2501(1); see I WiLuSToN, SALEs § 159 (1948). There-
fore in California where the goods would not be defined as "fungible" under the code,
but where they are nevertheless an indistinguishable part of a mass and "identification"
is intended by the parties, identification will occur allowing the passage of title and
thereby constituting a present sale. CAL. CoMm. CODE § 2401(1).
87 Compare CAL. Comm. CODE § 2201, with Uwo m, SAaEs AcT § 4, which was
based on 29 Car. 2, § 17 (1677), and reads: "(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any
goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upward shall not be
enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in
action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, or give some-
thing in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged
or his agent in that behalf." Then follows subsection (2) providing particularly for the
special case of goods to be manufactured by the seller for the buyer which are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business. In such case,
the provisions of the first section would not apply. Under the new code, other provisions
functioning as a Statute of Frauds are contained in the following sections: securities,
CAL. COMM. CODE § 8319; that for personal property not otherwise covered, CAL.
CoMM. CODE § 1206; and for enforceability of secured transactions, CAL. CoMM. CODE
§ 2903.
88U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
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quantity term (and this need not be accurately stated), but recovery
is limited to the amount stated. "The price, time and place of payment
or delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any particular warran-
ties may all be omitted." 9 Thus, besides evidencing a contract of sale
and being signed, it must specify a quantity, otherwise it is not
enforceable.
There are also provisions concerning written confirmations of such
contracts by one merchant to another which aim to protect against a
merchant-party's inadvertance or downright fraud when it is to his
advantage to use the no-signed-memorandum defense.90 Contracts for
goods to be specially manufactured for the buyer (goods which are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business) where the seller has made substantial progress in their
manufacture or has made commitments for their procurement are
excepted from the operation of the statute, provided the progress has
been made prior to notice of the buyer's repudiation and the circum-
stances are such as reasonably to indicate that the goods are for the
buyer.91 The conditions as set forth above protect the seller in the un-
usual case where he has made a substantial beginning in the man-
ufacturing process or has entered into commitments for materials for
the consummation of the contract, but leaves him high and dry where
the conditions- are not satisfied. This cures a considerable deficiency
of the Uniform Sales Act provision which did not require more than
a contract for goods to be specially manufactured for the buyer which
goods were not suitable for sale to others in the seller's ordinary course
of business, a provision which opened this area to possible fraud. As
has been said of this provision, "The fact that S manufactures some
special goods for B does not prove that B requested .him to do it, and
even if it did, there is no proof of the quantity term of the resultant
contract."9 2 Since oral contracts under the new code can be validated
by written confirmation, the practical solution is through the confirma-
tion of all oral contracts of sale, thus binding the other merchant-
party who has not signed if he does not respond contrariwise within
the ten days set by the statute.9 3
The official code contains a provision to the effect that if one
89 Ibid.
90 See text accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
91 CAL. Commi . CODE § 2201(3).
92 HAwELN, SALS AND Bu. SAL~s 34 (U.C.C. Practice Handbook No. 1,
1963).
93 See text 'accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
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"against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony
or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made," the contract
is enforceable if valid in other respects, but not beyond the quantity of
goods admitted." There is some question whether a demurrer would
constitute such an admission since it admits the facts alleged only for
the purpose of questioning the legal sufficiency of the pleading. And
there is also a problem of whether admissions in pre-trial proceedings
would suffice. California has not adopted this part of the statute
presumably for the reason that such a rule would encourage the com-
mission of perjury by false denial of the making of a contract. Cal-
ifornia is apparently the only one of the thirty jurisdictions thus far
enacting the code that has taken this position, and the comment of
the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code has
flatly rejected this stand 5 The question should be asked whether
this is the proper way of discouraging false assertions under oath or
whether this should be left to the criminal statutes punishing perjury.
Is it not equally immoral to permit one to escape an honest contract
which honest men would likely admit in pleading or on the witness
stand, if called by the plaintiff?
One further provision states that "with respect to goods for which
payment has been made and accepted or which have been received
and accepted," provided the contract is otherwise valid, it is enforce-
able to the extent of the accepted payment or reception. 0 This avoids
the fraud possible under the Uniform Sales Act provision which
permits the oral contract in all its aspects to be admissible if part
payment has been made or goods of any amount have been received
and accepted by the buyer.
While the late Professor Williston considered the code's Statute of
Frauds iconoclastic,97 it should prevent rather than encourage fraud.
Professor Corbin, who found it necessary to write a sizeable volume
on the previous statute's holdings in this area, concluded that the new
approach was to be preferred to the old 8 There should be less evasion
04 u.C.c. § 2-201(3) (b).
95 Pmu..Nm EDrroRIAL BoUND FoR THE UNn Omat CommnciM. CODE, REPORT
No. 2, REPoRT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE iN ADoTiNc STATES, U.C.C. § 2-201(3),
comment (1964).
96 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2201(3)c.
97 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
HARv. L. REv. 561, 572 (1950). He describes the Statute of Frauds provisions as "the
most iconoclastic in the Code." This article concerned an early draft and many important
changes were made in successive drafts up to the 1962 version, but the Statute of
Frauds' provisions are essentially the same as when Williston wrote.
9s Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE
May, 1965] U.C.C. ARTICLE 2.
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of 'honest contracts than was formerly the case. And the view com-
monly prevalent under the earlier statute that all essential terms of
the contract must appear in the memorandum in order for the memo-
randum to constitute compliance with the statute can no longer be
sustained. "Iconoclastic" perhaps, but based upon reasonable assump-
tions of what honest men should be permitted to do.
Conclusion
It should be apparent from the above discussion that in order to
understand the basic philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code an entirely new approach and mode of thinking must
be employed. Whereas title was of supreme importance under the
Uniform Sales Act, it is of little importance under the new code.
Whereas prior to now appropriation was used in the title determining
process, identification will be the term most used under the new code.
The search for specific remedies provided in the code will lead one to
a solution whether or not title has passed; and in the matter of drafting
or counseling the code gives adequate leeway for protective devices
for avoiding unexpected results. Differences in dealings between pro-
fessionals and nonprofessionals must be recognized, and practically all
that has been learned under the previous Statute of Frauds applicable
to contracts of sale will be of little assistance under the code provi-
sions. Through the recording provisions concerning sales and contracts
of sale of crops, timber (in the California version), and fixtures rea-
sonable security in such transactions is assured and if a secured trans-
action is involved, Article 9 of 'the code provides protection through
a similar recording process.
L.J. 821, 830-34 (1950). Corbin had his reservations, but the essence of these pages
is that fradulent practices are less possible under the new code's provisions. Corbin's
article makes reference to the same early draft Williston discussed.
